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nderstanding the channels throughwhich
/ monetary pohcy affects economic van
ahies has long been akey research topic
in macroeconomics and a central element of
economic policy analysis. At an operational
level, a “tightening” of monetary policy by the
Federal Reserveimplies a sale of bonds by the
Fed and an accompanying reduction ofbank
reserves. One question for debate in academic
and public policy circles in recent years is
whether this exchange between the central
bank and thebankingsystem has consequences
in addition to those foropen market interest
rates. Ac the risk ofoversimplifying the debate,
the question is often asked as whether the
traditional interest rate or “money view”
channel presented in most textbooks is aug-
mented by a “credit view” channel.’
There has been a great deal ofinterest in
this question in the past several years, moti-
vated both by developments in economic
models (in the marriage of models ofinfor-
mational imperfections in corporate finance
with traditional macroeconomic models) and
recent events (for example, the so-called credit
crunch during the 1990-91 recession),’ As I
elaborate below, however, it is not always
straightforward to define a meaningful credit
view alternative to the conventional interest
rate transmission mechanism. Similar diffi-
culties arise in structuring empirical tests of
credit view models,
This paper describes and analyzes abroad,
though still well-specified. version ofa credit
view alternative to the conventional monetary
transmission mechanism. in so doing, I
sidestep the credit view language per se, and
instead focus on isolating particular frictions
in financial arrangements and on developing
testable implications of those frictions, To
anticipate that analysis a bit, Iargue that
realistic models of “financial constraints” on
firms’decisions imply potentially significant
effects of monetary policy beyond those
working through conventional interest rate
channels. Pinpointing the effects ofa narrow
“bank lending” channel ofmonetary policy
is more difficult, though some recent models
and empirical work are potentially promising
in that regard.
I begin by reviewing the assumptions
and implications of the money view of the
monetary transmission mechanism and by
describing the assumptions and implications
of models offinancial constraints on borrow-
ers and models ofbank-dependent borrow-
ers- The balance of the article discusses the
transition from alternative theoretical models
ofthe transmission mechanism to empirical




Before discussing predictions for the
effects of alternative approaches on monetary
policy, it is useful to review assumptions
about intermediaries and borrowers in the
traditional interest rate view of the monetary
transmission mechanism. In this view, finan-
cial intermediaries (banks) offer no special
services on the asset side oftheir balance sheet -
On the liability side of their balance sheet,
banks perform a special role: The banking
system creates money by issuing demand
deposits. Underlying assumptions about
borrowers is the idea that capital structures
do not influence real decisions of borrowers
and lenders, ahe result of Modigliani and
Miller (1958). Applying the intuition of the
Modigliani andMiller theorem to banks, Fama
(1980) reasoned that shifts in the public’s
portfolio preferences among bank deposits,
‘For descriptons of the debate, see
Bernanke and Blinder (19f8) and
Bernanke (1993).
‘for on analysis of the ‘credit
crnnch’ episode, see Kliesen and
Totam (1992) and the studies in
the Federal feserne Bank of New
York (1994). The paper by Cantar
and Rndrigues in the New York Fed
studies considers the possibility of a
credit cmoch far nonbonk interme-
diaries.
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Fama’s insight amplifies the endier
contribution of Brainard and Tobin
(1963) that monetary policy con
he analyzed through its effects oe
investor portfalias.
Mare fenerolly, in a model with
many assets, this description would
assign to the money view of the
transmission mechanism effects on
spending arising fmm any changes
in the relative prices of assets,
While this simple tmoasset-mndel
description of the money view is
highly stylized, it is consistent with
a number of alternative models
beyond the texihank IS-IM model
(see, forexample, Hubbard, 1994),
including dynamic-equilibrium cash-
in-advance madels (far example,
Rotemberg, 1984; and Christiano
and fichenbaum, 1992).
‘Far an empidral descripton of this
transmission mechanism in the con-
text ofthe Federal Reserve’s forecast-
ing model, see Mauskapf (1990).
6 See, for example, “limited partici
ponien’ models as in Lucas (1990)
and Chrisfana and lichenbaum
(1992).
See, for example, analyses of
innentory irvestnnent ir Kashyap,
Stein and Wilcox (1993) and
Gerfer and Gilchist (1993). See
also the review of empirical studies
of business fined investment in
Chirinko (1993) and Cammins,
Hassett and Hubbard (1994).
a This current fashion actually has
long pedigree in macroecenemics,
with iniporlont cantrihutions by Fisher
(1933), Gudey and Show (1955,
960), Minsky (1964, 19/5) and
Walnilawer 11980), Some econa-
metric ferecosfing medels have also
focosed on financial factors in prop-
agafon mechaaisms (see, for
example, the description for the DRI
model in Eckstein and Sinai, 19861.
Cogan (19/2) provides an ernpiicol
analysis of money and bank lending
views. Mr early contributor tu the
contemporary credit view literature
is Bemanke (1983).
bonds or stocks should have no effect on real
outcomes; that is, the financial system is
merely a veil.’
Tokeep the story simple, suppose that
there are two assets—money and bonds,4
In amonetary contraction, the central bank
reduces reserves, hmiting the banking system’s
ability to sell deposits. Depositors (house-
holds) must then hold more bonds and less
money in theirportfolios. Ifprices do not
instantaneously adjust to changes in the money
supply the fall in household money holdings
represents adechne in real money balances, To
restore equilibrium, the real interest rate on
bonds increases, raising the user costof capital
for arange of planned investment activities,
and interest-sensitive spending falls.’
While the money viewis widely accepted
as the benchmark or “textbook” model for
analyzing effects of monetary policy on eco-
nomic activity, it relies on four key assump-
tions: (1) The central bank must control the
supply of“outside money,” forwhich there are
imperfect substitutes; (2) the centralbank can
affect real as well as nominalshort-tenn interest
rates (that is, prices do not adjust instanta-
neously); (3) policy-induced changes in real
short-term interest rates affect longer-term
interest rates that influence household and
business spending decisions; and (4) plausible
changes in interest-sensitive spending in
response to a monetary policy innovation
match reasonablywell with observed output
responses to such innovations.
In this stylized view, monetary policy is
represented by a change in the nominal supply
of outside money Of course, the quantity
of much ofthe monetary base is likely to be
endogenous.° Nonetheless, legal restrictions
(for example, reserverequirements) may
compel agents to use the outside asset for
some transactions, In practice, the central
bank’s influence over nominal short-ternn
interest rates (for example, the federal funds
rate in the United States) is uncontroversial,
There is also evidence that the real federal
funds rate responds to a shif’t in policy (see,
for example, Bernanke and Blinder, 1992).
Turning to the other assumptions,
that long-term rates used in many saving
and investment decisions should increase or
decrease predictably in response to a change
in short-term rates is not obvious a priori
based on conventional models of the term
structure, Empirical studies, however, have
documented a significant, positive relationship
between changes in the (nominal) federal
funds rateand the 10-year Treasury bond rate
(see, for example, Cohen andWenninger, 1993;
and Escrella and Hardouvelis, 1990). Finally
although many components ofaggregate
demand are arguably interest-sensitive (such
as consumer durables, housing, business fixed
investment, and inventory investment), output
responses to monetary innovations are large
relative to the generally small estimated effects
of user costs ofcapital on investment.’
I shall characterize the money view as
focusing on aggregate, as opposed to distribu-
tional, consequences ofpolicy actions. In
this view, higher default-risk-free rates of
interest following a monetary contraction
depress desired investment by firms and
households. While desired investment falls,
the reduction in business and household
capital falls on the least productive projects.
Such a view offers no analysis of distribu-
tional, or cross-sectional, responses to policy
actions, nor of aggregate implications of this
heterogeneity I review these points not to
suggest thatstandard interest rate approaches
to the monetary transmission mechanismare
incorrect, but to suggest stronglythat one
ought to expect that theyare incomplete.
HOW REASONABLE IS THE
CREDIT VIEW?
The search for a transmission mechanism
broader than that just described reflects two
concerns, one “macro” and one “micro,” The
macro concern, mentioned earlier, is that
cyclical movements in aggregate demand—
particularly business fixed investment and
inventory investment—appear too large to
be explained by monetary policy actions that
have not generally led to large changes in
real interest rates, This has pushed some
macroeconomists to identify financial factors
in propagating relatively small shocks, fac-
tors that correspond to accelerator models
that explain investment data relatively well,0
Indeed, I use the term “financial accelerator”
(put forth by Bernanke, Gender and Gilchrist,
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forthcoming) to refer to the magnification of
initial shocks by financial market conditions,
The micro concern relates to theemer-
gence ofa growing literature studying infor-
mational imperfections in insurance and credit
markers. In this line ofinquiry problems of
asynimetric information between borrowers
and lenders lead to agap between the cost
of external finance and internal finance.
The notion of costly external finance stands
in contrast to the more complete-markets
approach underlying the conventional interest
rate channels, which does not consider hnks
between real and financial decisions,r
Although a review of this literature is
beyond the scope of this article, I want to
mention three common empirical implica-
tions that have emerged from models of the
financial accelerator’0 The first, which Ijust
noted, is thatuncollaceralized external finance
is more expensive than internal finance,
Second, thespread between the cost ofexternal
and internal finance varies inversely with the
borrower’s net worth—internal funds and
collateralizable resources—relative to the
amount of funds required. Third, an adverse
shock to a borrower’s net worth increases the
cost ofexternal finance and decreases the
ability of the borrower to implement invest-
ment, employment and production plans.
This channel provides the financial accelerator,
magnifying an initial shock to net worth,
(See, for example: Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen, 1988; Gertler and Hubbard, 1988;
Cantor, 1990; Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein,
1991; Calomiris and Hubbard, forthcoming;
Hubbard and Kashyap, 1992; Oliner and
Rudebusch, 1992; Fazzariand Petersen, 1993;
Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited, forthcoming;
Bond and Meghir, 1994; Cummins, Hassett
and Hubbard, 1994; Carpenter, Fazzari and
Petersen, 1994; and Sharpe, 1994.)” Links
between internal net worth and broadlydefined
investment (holding investment opportunities
constant) have been corroborated inanumber
of empiricalstudies.rr
Let me now extend this argument to
include a channel for monetarypolicy” In
the money vie~policy actions affect the
overall level of real interest rates and inter-
est-sensitive spending. The crux ofmodels
of information-related financial frictions is
agapbetween the cost ofexternal and internal
finance for many borrowers, In this context,
the creditview offers channels through which
monetary policy (open market operations or
regulatoryactions) can affect this gap. That
is, the credit view encompasses distributional
consequences of policy actions, because the
costs offinance respond differently fordifferent
types of borrowers. Two such channels have
been discussed in earlier work: (1) financial
constraints on borrowers and (2) the exis-
tence of bank-dependent borrowers,
Any story describing acredit channel for
monetary policy must have asits foundation
the idea that some borrowers facehigh costs
ofexternal finance, In addition, models of
a financial accelerator argue that the spread
betweenthe cost of externaland internal funds
varies inversely with the borrowers’ net worth,
Itis this role ofnet worth which offers a
channel through which policy-induced
changes in interest rates affect borrowers’
net worth (see, for example, Gertler and
Hubbard, 1988). Intuitively increases in the
real interest rate in response to a monetary
contraction increase borrowers’ debt-service
burdens and reduce the present value of
collateralizable net worth, thereby increasing
the marginal cost ofexternal finance and
reducing firms’ ability to carry out desired
investment and employment programs, This
approach offers acredit channel even if open
market operations have mo direct quantity
effect on banks’ ability to lend, Moreover,
this approach implies thatspending by low-
net-worth firms is likely to fall significantly
following a monetary contraction (to the
extent that the contraction reduces borrowers’
net worth).
t~5~.flceOt H~cyncc4f’pndànrt
The second channel stresses that some
borrowers depend upon banks for external
funds, and thatpolicy actions can have adirect
impact on the supply ofloans. When banks
are subject to reserverequirements on liabihties,
a monetary contraction drains reserves,
Potential effects of advene selec-
tion problems on market allocation
have been addressed in important
papers by Akedof(1970) and
Rothschild and Stglitz (1976), and
have been applied to moo markets
bylaffee and Russell (1976) and
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and to
equity markets by Myers and
Wailaf (1984). Research an piaci
pal-agent problems in finance has
followed the contribotion of larson
and Meckling (1976). Gertler
11988), Bernanke (1993) and
King and Lenine (1993) pmvide
reviews of related models of infor-
mational imperfectiens in capital
markets.
“See also the review in Bernanke,
Gender and Gilchrist (forthcoming).
These implications ore consistent
with a wide class of models, inrInd-
ing those of Townsend (1979),
Blinder and Stiglitz (1983),
Farmer (1985), Williamsen
(1987), Bereunke and Gender
(1989, 1990), Calominis and
Hubbard (1990), Sharpe (19901,
Hart and Meow (19911, Kiyotaki
and Moore (1993), Gender
(1992), Greerwald and Stiglitz
(1988, 19931 and Iomoat(1993).
‘‘Far households, Mishkin 119/7,
1978) and Leldes (19891 pmnide
evidence of effects of hausehold
balance sheet conditions on con-
sumer enpenditures.
The appendin presents a simple
model that illustrates these predic-
tions.
“For broader desciptiens of credit
view arguments, see Bemanke
(1993), friedman and Kottner
(1993), Gender (1993), Gerfer
and Gilchrist (1993) and Kashyap
and Stein (1994). An early eupo-
sition of a role for cmditavailability
appears in fooso (1951).
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“Models of equlibrium credit
rationing onder adverse selection
(for enample, Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981) offer another mechanism
through which on increase in the
level of defanlt-risk-free real interest
mtes reduces loon sapply. Credit
rationing is rot reqaired for the
bonk-dependent-barrower channel
no be operative. Insteod, what is
required is that loans tu these bor-
rawers are an imperfect substitute
for other assets and that tine bar-
roman lack alternative sources of
finance.
° Colomiris and Kahn (1991) offer
model of demandable debttu
haooce bank lending.
‘‘A substantial body of empitical evi
dence sopports the idea that banks
offer special services in the lending
process. For example, James
(19871 and lummer and
McCaneell (1989) find that the
announcement of a bank loon, oil
else equal, mises the share ptice of
the barmwing firm, likely reflecting
the information content ol the
bank’s assessment, In a similar
spirit, loma (1985) and James
(1987) find Chat honks’ borramers,
rather than banks’ depositors, bear
the incidence ol reserve reqaire-
ments (indicating that borrowers
mast not hove easy access tu other
sources of funds). Petersen and
Ralan (1994) show that small
businesses tend to rely on lacal
hanks for enternal funds.
‘‘See, far euomple, the discussion in
Petersen and Roman mi 994).
re Omens and Schreft (1992) discuss
the ident’dication of ‘credit crunch-
es.’ See also the description in
Hubbard 11994),
possibly decreasing banks’ ability to lend. As
aresult, credit allocated to bank-dependent
borrowers may fall, causing these borrowers
to curtail their spending. In the IS-LM
framework of Bernanke and Blinder (1988),
both the IS and LM curves shift to the left in
response to amonetary contraction, Alterna-
tively an adverse shock to banks’ capital could
decrease both banks’ lending and thespending
by bank-dependent borrowers. Such bank
lending channels magnify the decline in out-
put as aresult of the monetary contraction,
and the effect of the contraction on the real
interest rate is muted. This basic story raises
three questions, relating to: (1) why certain
borrowers may be bank-dependent (that is,
unable to accessopen market credit or borrow
from nonbank financial intermediaries or
other sources), (2) whether exogenouschanges
in banks’ ability to lend can be identified, and
(3) (forthe analysisofopen market operations)
whether banks have access to sources of funds
not subject to reserve requirements.
The first question is addressed, though
not necessarily resolved, by the theoretical
literature on the development offinancial
intermediaries”, In much ofthis research
(see especially Diamond, 1984; andBoyd
and Prescott, 1986), intermediaries offer
low-cost means of monitoring some classes
of borrowers. Because ofinformational fric-
tions, non-monitored finance entails dead-
weight spending resources on monitoring. A
free-rider problem emerges, however, in pub-
lic markets with a large number of creditors.
The problem is mitigated by having a finan-
cial intermediary hold the loans and act as a
delegated monitor, Potential agency problems
at the intermediary level are reduced by having
the intermediary hold a diversified loan port-
folio financed principally by publicly issued
debt.” This line of research argues rigorously
that borrowers for whom monitoring costs
are significant will be dependent upon inter-
mediaries for external finance,” and that costs
ofswitching lenders will be high.” It does not,
however, necessarily argue forbank dependence
(for example, finance companies areinterme-
diaries financed by non-deposit debt).
Second, even ifone accepts the premise
that some borrowers arebank-dependent in
the sense described earlier, one must identify
exogenous changes in banks’ ability to lend.
Four such changes have been examined in
previous research. The first focuses on the
role playedby banking panics, in which
depositors’ flight to quality—converting hank
deposits to currency or government debt—
reduces banks’ ability to lend (for empirical
evidence, see Bernanke, 1983, and Bernanke
andJames, 1991, for the 1930s and Calomiris
and Hubbard, 1989, for the National Banking
period).
A second argument emphasizesregulatory
actions, such as that underbinding Regulation
Q ceilingsin the United States (see, for
example, Schreft, 1990; Kashyap and Stein,
1994; and Romer and Romer, 1993) andreg-
ulation of capital adequacy (see, for example,
Bernanke and Lown, 1992; and Peek and
Rosengren, l992).,~Empirical evidence for
this channel is quite strong. Third, Bizer
(1993) suggests that increasedregulatory
scrutiny decreased banks’ willingness to
lend in the early 1990s, all else equal.
The fourth argument stresses exogenous
changes in bank reservesas aresult ofshifts
in monetary policy In principle, such a shift
in monetary policy could be identified with a
discrete change in the federal funds rate in the
aftermath ofadynamic open market operation
or with achange in reserve requirements.
Because the effects on reserves of changes in
reserve requirements are generally offset by
open market operations, bank-lending-chan-
nel stories are generally cast in terms of open
market operations.
An illustration ofthe gap between models
and practice surfaces in addressing the third
question ofthe easewith which banks can raise
funds from non-deposit sources (for example,
CDs), when the Fed decreases reserves. Romer
and Romer (1990) have pointed out, for
example, that if banks see deposits and CDs
as perfect substitutes, the link between open
market operations and the supply of credit to
bank-dependent borrowers is broken. Banks
are unlikely however, to face a perfectly elastic
supply schedule for CDs at the prevailing CD
interest rate, Since large-denomination CDs
arenot insured at the margin by federal deposit
insurance, prospective lenders must ascertain
the quality of the issuing bank’s portfolio.
Given banks’ private information about at
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least aportion oftheir loan portfolio, adverse
selection problems will increase the marginal
cost of external finance as more funds are
raised (see, for example, Myers and Majluf,
1984; and Lucas and McDonald, 1991). In
addition, as long as somebanks faceconstraints
on issuing CDs and those banks lead to
bank-dependent borrowers, a bank lending
channel will be operative.
While the foregoing discussion centers
on open market operations, regulatory actions
by the central bank—credit controls, for
example—represent another way in which
monetary policy can have real effects through
influencing the spending decisions ofbank-
dependent borrowers. Here the effects are
likely to be more pronounced than for the
case of open market operations, since the
question of the cost ofnon-deposit sources
of funds is no longer central, and theeffec-
tiveness of such regulatory actions depends
only on the existence ofbank-dependent
borrowers.
flQffsfl~ly~tsnCrr?it°. MOLWLC TQ
‘2 °2~2er ‘2’2inø°i’24 srts’2i,.fd’2c2,22
Both the financial-constraints-on-bor-
rowers and bank-lending-channel mechanisms
imply significantcross-sectional differences
in firms’shadow costof finance and in the
response of thatcost to policy-induced changes
in interest rates. Accordingly empirical
researchers have attempted to test these
cross-sectional implications. As I examine
this literature, I explore howModigliani-Miller
violations fornonfinancial borrowers, financial
intermediaries or both offer channels for
monetary policy beyond effects on interest
rates. The appendix frames this discussion




Studies Using Aqqregote Da.tu
The microeconomic underpinnings of
both financial accelerator models and the
credit view of monetarypolicy hinge on
certain groups ofborrowers (perhaps including
banks or other financial intermediaries) facing
incomplete financial markets, Examining
links between the volume ofcredit and eco-
nomic activity in aggregate data (with an eye
toward studying the role played by bank-
dependent borrowers) requires great care.
Simply finding that credit measures lead output
in aggregate time-series data is also consistent
with a classofmodels in which credit is passive,
responding to finance expectedfuture output
(as in King and Plosser, 1984), Consider the
case of amonetary contraction, for example.
The effect of the contraction on interest rates
could depress desired consutnption and
investment spending, reducing the demand
for loans.
In a clever paper that has stimulated a
number of empirical studies, Kashyap, Stein
and Wilcox (1993)—henceforth, KSW—
examine relative fluctuations in the volume
ofbank loans and a close open market sub-
stitute, issuance of commercial paper. In the
KSW experiment, upward or downward
shifts in both bank lending and commercial
paper issuance likely reflect changes in the
demand for credit, However, a fall in bank
lending while commercial paper issuance is
rising might suggest that bank loan supply is
contracting. To consider this potential co-
movement, KSW focus on changes over time
in the mix between bank loans andcommer-
cial paper (defined as bank loans divided by
the sum ofbankloans and commercial paper).
They find that, in response to increases in
the federalfunds rate (or, less continuously
at the times of the contractionary policy
shiftsidentified by Romer and Romer, 1989).
the volume of commercial paper issues rises,
while bank loans gradually decline, They
also find that policy-induced changes in the
mix have independent predictive power for
inventory and fixed investment, holding con-
stant other determinants.”
The aggregate story told by KSWmasks
significant firm-level heterogeneity however.
The burden ofa decline in bank loans fol-
lowing amonetary contraction is borne by
smaller firms (see Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994).”
Moreover, the evidence in Oliner and
Rudebusch (1993) indicates that once trade
credit is incorporated in the definition of
small firms’ debt andonce firm size is held
Oliner and fadebasch(1993) and
Friedman and Kattaner (1993) hone
disputed the KSW interpretation of
the mia as measadag a substitution
between bank loans and commer-
cial paper. They argue than, during
recession, shifts in the miu are
erplained by an increase in con
merciol paper issuance rather than
by a decrease in bank loans,
“Morgan (1993) finds a similar
result in en 000lysis of loan corn-
mitments, After an episode of
monetary contraction, firms withont
loan commitments receive a small-
er share of bank loans.
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1’ Toward this end, more direct com-
parisons of borrowing by bark-
dependent and nonboak.dependent
barrowers hove been offered.
Using firm-lenel data, Kashyop,
tamont end Steir (1994)—
henceforth KLS—follow the
Fozzari, Hubbarri and Petersen
11988) approach of classifying
groups of firms as a priori finance-
constrained hr this case, bank-
dependent) or not. Ir particular,
they stody inventory investment by
peblicly traded firms mitlr and with-
out bond rotirgs, as a prony for
bank dependence. focusing on the
1982 recession (as an indirect
wears of identifying a period fol-
lowing a tight money episode),
they find that inventury innestnent
by nan-rated firms was influenced,
all else equal, by the firms’ own
cash holdings, on effect not present
for the innertory investment by
rated firms, tn subsequent boom
years (which KLS identify with on
easy money episode), they lied lit-
in effect of cash holdings on inven-
tory investment for either non-roted
or rated companies. These patterns
lead KtS to conclude that a bank
lending channel was operative in
response to the monetary contrac-
tion. Hawener, the KLS resolts are
consistent with a more general
model in which low-nat-worth firms
foce more costly erternalfinance in
downtnrns.
constant, monetary policy changes do not
alter the mix.
It also does not appear that hank-depen-
dent borrowers switch to the commercial
paper market following amonetary contrac-
tion. Instead, the increase in commercial
paper issuance reflects borrowing by large
firms with easy access to the commercial
paper market, possibly to smooth fluctua-
tions in their flow of funds when earnings
decline (Friedman and Kuctner, 1993) or to
finance loans to smaller firms (Calomiris,
Himmelherg and Wachtel, forthcoming).
More convincing empirical tests focus
on the cross-sectional implication ofthe
underlying theories—namely that credit-
market imperfections affect investment,
employment or production decisions of some
borrowers more than others. At one level,
existingcross-sectional empirical studies have
been successful: There is asubstantial body
ofempirical evidencedocumenting that proxies
for borrowers’ net worth affect investment
more forlow-nec-worth borrowers than for
high-net-worth borrowers (holding constant
invesnnent opportunities). This suggests
that, to the extent that monetary policy can
affectborrowers’ net worth, pure interest
rate effects of open market operations will
be magnified.
Thesecond body ofempirical analysis of
information-related imperfections focuses on
the effects ofmonetary policy on borrowers’
balance sheets. Gercler and Hubbard (8988)
conclude that, all else equal. internal funds
have a greater effect on investment by non-
dividend-paying firms during recessions.
The evidence of Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)
is particularly compelling here. Analyzing
the behavior of manufacturing firms summa-
rized in the Quarterly Financial Reports data,
Gertler and Gilchrist consider differences in
small and large firms’ responses to tight
money (as measured by federal funds rate
innovations or the dates identified by Romer
and Romer, 1989). In particular, small firms’
sales, inventories and short-term debt
decline relative to those for large firms over a
two-year period following amonetary tight-
ening, results consistent with the financial
accelerator approach. They also demonstrate
that the effects of shifts in monetary policy
on the small-firm variables are sharper in
periods when the small-firm sector as awhole
is growing more slowly also consistent with
the financial accelerator approach. Finally
they show that the ratio ofcash flow to interest
expense (a measure ofdebt-service capacity)
is associated positively with inventory accu-
mulation for small, but not for large, manu-
facturing firms.
The Gertler and Gilchrist results, which
are very much in the spirit of the earlier
cross—sectional tests of financial accelerator
models, have been borne out for studies of
fixed investment by Olinerand Rudebusch
(1994) and for inventory investment by
Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994),” In addi-
tion, Ramey (1993) shows that, for forecast-
ing purposes, the ratio of the sales growth of
small firms to that forlarge firms offers sig-
nificant information about future GDP.
Finally using the firm-level data
underlying the aggregates summarized in
the Quarterly Financial Reports, Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrisc (forthcoming) analyze
the differences in sales and inventories between
largeand small manufacturing firms by
two-digit industry They find that fluctua-
tions in the large firm-small firm differences
areroughly the same size as fluctuations in
the corresponding aggregate fluctuations for
the manufacturing sector. Because small firms’
sales (as they define small firms) comprise
about one-third ofthe sales ofthe manufac-
turing sector, roughly one-third ofcyclical
fluctuations in manufacturing sales can be
explained by large firm-small firm differences,
M.S’MSSSIflST ‘2220. Durtk t.uncnnq
While the principal empirical predictions
ofthe financial accelerator approachhave been
corroborated in micro-data studies and low-
nec-worth firms appear to respond differen-
tially to monetary contractions, the question
of the role ofbanks remains. I consider this
question below in three steps.
First, is there evidence ofsignificant
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departures from Modigliani and Miller’s
results for certain groups of banks in the
sense that have been identified for firms?
Second, is there evidence that small- or low-
net-worth firmsare more likely to he the
loan customers of such banks? Finally do
low-net-worth firms have limitedopportuni-
ties to substitute credit from unconstrained
financial institutions when cut off by con-
strained financial institutions?
0
Kashyap and Stein (1994) apply the
intuition ofthe models ofeffects of internal
net worth on investment decisions by nonfi-
nancial firms to study financing and lending
decisions by banks. This is an important
line of inquiry in the hank lending channel
research agenda, because ft addresses the ease
with which banks can alter their financing
mix in response to a change in bank reserves
and the effect of changes in the financing
mix on the volume of bank lending. Just as
earlier studies focused on cross-sectional dif-
ferences in financing and real decisions of
nonfinancial firms of different size, Kashyap
and Stein analyze cross-sectional differences
in financingand lending decisions of banks
of different size. To do this, they use data
drawn from the quarterly “Call Reports”
collected by the Federal Reserve,
Kashyap and Stein construct asset size
groupings for large banks (those in the 99th
percentile) and small banks (defined as those
at or below the 75th, 90th, 95th or 98th
percentiles). They first show that contrac-
tionary monetary policy (nneasured by an
increase in the federal funds rate) leads to
a similar reduction in the growth rate ofnom-
inal core deposits for all hank size classes.
They find significant heterogeneity across
hank size classes, however, in the response
of the voluene oflending to a change in mon-
etary policy In particular, amonetary corn-
traction leads to an increase in lending in
t.he short run by very large banks. This is in
contrast to a decline in lending in the short
run by smaller banks. These do not simply
reflect differences in the type ofloans made
by largeand small banks. A sinnilar pattern
emerges when loans are disaggregated to
include just commercial and industrial loans.
One possible explanation for the Kashyap
and Stein pattern is that amonetary contrac-
tion weakens the balance sheet positions of
small firms relative to large firms. Ifsmall
firms tend to be the customers of smallbanks
and large firms tend to be the custoaners of
large banks, a fall in loan demand (by small
borrowers) for small banks could be consis-
tent with the differential lending responses
noted by Kashyap and Stein, To examine
this possibility Kashyap and Stein analyze
whether small banks increase their holdings
of securities relative to largebanks during a
monetary contraction, They actually find
chat small banks’ securities holdings are less
sensitive to monetary policy than large banks’
securities holdings, though the difference in
the responses is not statistically significant.
The use of hank size as a measure to gen-
erate cross-sectional differences does not corre-
spond precisely to the underlying theoretical
models, which stress the importance ofnet
worth. In this context, bank capital may he
abetter proxy Peek and Rosengren (forth-
coming) analyze the lending behavior of New
England banks over the 1990-9 1 recession.
Their results indicate that the loans ofwell
capitalized banks fell by less than the loans
of poorly capitalized banks.” Hence, as with
the Kashyap and Stein findings, their evidence
suggests there are effects ofinfonnational
imperfections in financial markets on the
balance sheets of intermediaries aswell
as horrowers.
tanrnvnu ti~rrcJvePt-cnr,d ~
The last Iwo questions relate to the
matching of borrowers and lenders. The
former asks whether the firms identified by
empirical researchers as finance-constrained
are the loan customers of the constrained
(small) banks such as those identified by
Kashyap and Stein. This line of inquiry
requires an examination of data on individ-
ual loan transactions, with information on
characteristics of the borrower, lender and
lending terms.” One could establish whether
constrained firms are the customers of con-
strained banks and whether such firms
“Using dotu on commercial banks
natonwrle onerthe 1979-92 period,
Berger and Udell 119941 bond lit-
tle enidence that the introduction of
tisk-irased capitul requirements per Se
affected credit ollocotior. Hancock,
Laing and Wilcan 119941 also rse
qvortedy data on iudividuul honk’s
portfolios to estimate the respan-
sireress of portfolio composition to
changes in capitol requirements.
They find that ‘copitul shortfall’
institutions reduced their Cal loors
response by larger total amounts,
all else equal, titer ‘copitol surplus’
institutions.
‘2 Aril Koshyop, Darius Polio andlore
cunertfy ergoged ir such an anolyis.
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‘2 Another possibil’ty is that the
weakened balance sheet positions
of many borrowers precipitutes
o ‘flightto quality’ by lenders
generally, increasing the demand
for commercial paper issues of
large firms,
‘5The dates of monetary policy
contractions saggested by Rower
and Rawer (19891 have generated
significant controversy. Shapiro
(1994) argues, for erawple,
that empirical evidencefarors the
hypothesis thnt several Rower dates
are predictable asing weaseres
of unemployment and infanion
as deterninants ofactions by the
Federal Open Market Committee;
see also the discussion in Cecchett
(1995). Hoover and Perez (1994)
offer a number of criticisms of the
lowers’ appraach.




where Y is the percentage change
in real GOP miatine to potential
GOP, His the percentuge chatge in
the high-employmentfederal bad-
get surplus, F is the change in the
federol funds rate, tis the currerot
time period, and idenotus lags.
See, forenample, Hirtle and Kelleher
(1990), Pen-y and Schultze (1992)
and Cohen and Wenninger (19931.
“Cover (1992) finds still stronger
evidence of asymmetric effects
when monetary aggregates are
used as the policy indicator instead
of the federal funds rnte,
switch from constrained banks to uncon-
strained ones during episodes ofmonetary
contractions. Theories emphasizing theimpor-
tance of ongoingborrower-lender relationships
imply that suchswitches are costly and unhkely
Iftrue, part of themonetary transmission
mechanism takes place through reductions
in loan supply by constrained banks.
The latter of the two questions suggests
the need to study abroader class oflenders
than banks, Ifborrowers from constrained
banks can switch at low cost to nonbank
lenders following amonetary contraction,
the narrow bank credit channel of monetary
policyis frustrated. In this vein, Calomiris,
Flimmelberg andWachtel (forthcoming) ana-
lyze finn-level data on commercial paper
issuance and argue that large, high-quality
commercial paper-issuing flrnms increase
paper borrowings during downturns to
finance loans to smaller firms.’2 They note
that accounts receivable rise for paper-issu-
ing firms, supporting the notion chat these
firms may serve as trade credit intermedi-
aries for smaller firms in some periods.
From the standpoint of the bank lending
channel, it is important to establish what
happens to the costs and terms imposed by
these intermediaries. If, on the one hand,
such terms are no more costly than bank
intermediary finance, then the switch ofbor-
rowers from being bank customers to being
trade credit customers entails very limited
macroeconomic effects. On the other hand,
iflarge, paper-issuing firms accept their
intermediary role reluctantly very costly
trade credit may exacerbate adownturn
by raising the cost offunds for constrained
firms. More empirical investigation of
trade credit terms is needed to resolve
this question.
More empirical research is also needed
to assess the validity of the basic money
view A central problem is that, while most
empirical studies focus on monetary aggre-
gates suchas M2, the theoretical description
offered in the first section suggests an emphasis
on outside money and, importantly on com-
ponents of outside money over which the
central bank can exercise exogenous control.
First identifying exogenous changes in mone-
tamy policy is difficult.’5 Recentresearch by
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (forthcoming) offers
promising strategies for studying the effects
of monetary policy shocks.
In addition, recent analyses of policy-
reduced-form models document a significant,
negative relationship in quarterly data between
the percentage change in real GDP relative to
potential GDP and the change in the federal
funds rate.mu Such studies must first confront
the possibility that the measured interest
sensitivity ofoutput reflects links between
interest race and net worth changes for certain
groups ofborrowers/spenders. A second
issue, noted by Morgan (1993) and Cohen
and Wenninger (1993), is that quarterly
residuals from estimated policy-reduced-form
equations display large negative errors during
recessions, suggesting the possibility ofan
asymmetric response of economic activity to
increases or decreases in the federal funds
~ Finally more theoretical and empirical
research is needed to examine links between
changes in short-term real interest rates (which
are significantly influenced by pohcy actions)
and changes in long-term real interest races





This survey argues that the terms money
view and credit view are not alwayswell-
defined in theoretical and empirical debates
over the transmission mechanism of mone-
tary policy Recent models ofinformation
and incentive problems in financial markets
suggest the usefulness of decomposing the
transmission mechanism into two parts: one
related to effects of policy-induced changes
on the overall level ofreal costs of funds; and
one related to magnification (or financial
accelerator effects) stemming from impacts
of policy actions on the financial positions of
borrowers and/or intermediaries.
Two observations emerge clearly from
the literature, First, the spending decisions
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of asignificant group of borrowers are influ-
enced by their balance sheet condition in the
ways described by financial accelerator models.
Second, even in the presence of more sophis-
ticated financial arrangements, there are still
information costs of screening, evaluation
and monitoring in the credit process, impart-
ing aspecial role for intermediaries (be they
banks or other lenders) with cost advantages
in performing these tasks.’°
The first observation suggests that
financial factorsare likely to continue to play
arole in business fluctuations. The second
suggests thatregulatory policies affecting
information-specializing intermediaries are
likely to affect the cost of credit for at least
some borrowers, In part because ofinterest
in alternative views of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism and in part because of
concern overthe effects ofinstitutional change
in the financial system, academics and poli-
cymakers are analyzing whether the scope
for monetary policy to affect real outcomes
is becoming narrower. Both observations
noted above are consistent with a heightened
role for monetary policy in affectingreal
decisions of firms with weak balance sheet
positions. Developing ways to incorporate
borrower heterogeneity in both economic
models of money and credit and in forecasting
is an important, practical task for economic
modelers and policymakers.
Whether the simplest bank lending
channel—that a fall in banks’ reserves fol-
lowing contractionary open marketoperations
decreases both banks’ ability to lend andbor-
rowers’ ability to spend—is operative is not
clear, however, More micro-evidence at the
level of individual borrower-lender transac-
tions is needed to resolve this question. At
the same time, proponents of the simplest
characterization of an interest rate channel
must address both the cross-sectional hetero-
geneity in firms’response to monetary policy
and the extent to which observed interest rate
effects on output reflect differentiallylarge
effects ofpolicy on certain classesofborrowers,
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THE FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR AND THE CREDIT VIEW
There are three basic conclusions of
models of financial frictions relating to asym-
metric information between borrowers and
)enders: (1) Uncollateralized external finance
is more costly thaninterna) finance; (2) the
spread between the cost of external and
internal funds varies negativelywith the level
of the borrower’s internal funds; and (3) a
reduction in internal funds reduces thebor-
rower’s spending, holding constant underlying
investment opportunities. I illustrate chese
conclusions (and hnk them to empirical tests
of creditview models) below in a simple
model offirm investment decisions adapted
from Gertler and Hubbard (T988).
Consider two periods—zero and one.
In thefirst, arisk-neutral borrower uses inputs
to produce output Y to sell in the second
period. These inputs are hard capital, K—
say, machinery—and soft capital, C—inputs
which improve the productivity ofhard capital
(such as organizational or maintenance
expenditures). The production technology
is risky, with two possible productivity states,
“good” and “bad”; uncertainty is realized
after the investment decision is made.
To make the example as simple as possi-
ble, suppose the firm can increase the chance
of a good output realization ifit uses a stnffi-
cient quantity ofsoft capital, where sufficient
is definedby a level proportional to the
quantity ofhard capital used, In particular,
let output Y satisfy:










wherejKK) is twice continuously differen-
tiable, strictly increasing, and strictly con-
cave (wheref(O) = O,f’(O) = oo, andf’(z) — 0
as z —~ 00); ira + gb = 1; 0 <cc <1; v> 0; and
the random productivity realization is idio-
syncratic.
The structure of the problem guarantees
that the firm will either use vKunits ofsoft
capital or none, For simplicity, assume that
it is always efficient to employ softcapital.
(Formally, this requires one to assume that
(irs + zrbc4I(1+v) >ct).
Ifthere are no informational imperfec-
tions, the firm’sinvestment decisionis intu-
itive, It chooses Kt osatisfy
(3A) (ir
5
+ ,rta)f~(K)—(1+ v)r = 0,
where a- is the gross interest rate facedby the
firm. Equation 2A simply states that, at the
optimum, the expected marginal benefit
from an additional unit ofhard capital (given
a complementary addition of v units ofsoft
capital) equals the marginal cost ofinvesting.
The value ofK that satisfies equationA2 —
call it K*_ does not depend on anyfinancial
variables; that is, the Modigliani andMiller
theorem applies.
The traditional interest rate channel
often identified with the money view mecha-
nism is easy to illustrate in this example.
Suppose for simplicity that the interest rate
paid on deposits is zero, so that a- represents
the gross required rate ofreturn on lending.
Tothe extent that an open market sale raises
a-, investment demand falls, This is the usual
textbook interest rate channel for monetary
policy
Under asymmetric information, the
story is more complicated. Consider, for
example, a simple agency problem:
Expenditures on hard capital are observable
by outside lenders, while expenditures on
soft capital arenot. In this case, the manager
may be tempted to divertsoft capital funds
to personal gain. Such perquisite consump-
tion can take a number of forms. For sim-
plicity assume that the manager can invest
the funds (say in a Swiss bank account) to
yield a gross interest rate, a-.
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Lenders understand this temptation,
and modify the financial contract to mitigate
incentives to cheat. Asshown below, one
consequence ofthis modification is that desired
capital, K*, may exceedactual capital, K, and
this gap will depend inversely on thebor-
rower’s net worth. Suppose the firm signs a
loan contract with acompetitive financial
intermediary The firm has some initial liq-
uid asset position, W, and collaceralizable
future profits, V, in period one, worth apre-
sent value of Via-. Hence, the firm’sinitial net
worth is (W + Via-). To make the story inter-
esting, assume that W <K~that is, the firm
would like to borrow, (For a richer descrip-
tion ofthe role ofinternal net worth in the
contracting problem, see Gertler, 1992.)
The firm-intermediary loan contract
specifies the amount borrowed (in this case,
(1 + v)K — W)), a payment P5 to theinter-
mediary in the event that the project yields
the “good” output level, and apayment Pb in
the event of the “bad” output level. These
contractual features are chosen to maximize
the firm’sexpected profits:
(4A) (irr+zrba)f(K)_ZVSPS_ irbpb,
From the intermediary’s perspective, the
loan contract must offer an expected return
equal to its opportunity cost of funds, which
equals the gross interest rate a- times the
quantity borrowed:
(5A) ir5P5
+ ir~p~ = r[(i +v)K — w].
That is, for simplicity assume that theinter-
mediary simply channels funds from savers
to borrowers, and uses no resources.
Given the underlying incentive problem,
the contract must give the firm the incentive
to invest in soft capital as a complementary
input to hard capital. That is, the contract
must satisfy the “incentive constraint:”
(6A) (ir5+ ir5a)f(K)- (zr5P5+ 2~hPr~)
Equation 6Ajust states that themanager’s
expected gain from honest action exceeds
the gain from diverting the soft capital funds
to personal use.
One way in which the intermediary
could reduce the entrepreneur’s temptation
to cheat is to increase the amount of ph that
the firm must pay the intermediary in the
eventof abad outcome, The firm, however,
can only credibly promise to pay available
assets in the bad state, That is, a limited lia-





To summarize, the contracting problem
involves the selection ofK, P5 and P5 to max-
imize equation 4A subject to equations 5A,
flAand 7A. One case is easy: As long as the
incentive constraint does not bind, actual
investment, K, simply adjusts to desired
investment K*, In addition, the pattern of
contract payments is indeterminate. (For
simplicity I am abstracting from aricher
structure that would lead to both debt and
equity contracts and tax considerations; see,
for example, Gertler and Hubbard, 1993, for
such a treatment.)
When the incentive constraint in equa-
tion 6Abinds, financing and investment
decisions are no longer independent. First,
note that when the incentive constraint
binds, it is desirable to raise P5 to the maxi-
mum extent possible; therefore, the limited
liability constraint in equation 7Aalso binds.
Using 5Aand 7A, one can eliminate ~5 and
p5 from equation 6A, and thereby obtain a
relation among K, the interest rate and inter-
nal net worth:
(8A) (~a +ir~ct)f(K)
+ 2v)]K + a-(w + via-) = 0.
As long as equation SA holds, investment
Kis an increasing function of the borrower’s




The explanation for this effect is that,
when the incentive constraint binds, an
increase in internal networth increases the
amount of feasible investment.
The existence ofthe net worth channel
precludes neither the traditional interest rate
channel nor the bank lending channel, To
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see the former, note an increase in lenders’
opportunity cost of funds on account of a
monetary contraction reduces desired invest-
ment K* (since K* is determined by (ia5 +
zr5cc)f’(K) = (1 + v)a-). To see the latter, note
that, to the extent thatbanks face ahigher
marginal opportunity cost offunds because of
a less than perfectly elastic supply schedule
for managed liabilities (and borrowers lack
access to nonbank finance), the increase in a-
lowers both desired and actual investment.
This simple framework is consistent
with the description ofthe flitancial accelerator
mechanism: The cost of uncollateralized
external finance exceeds that for internal
finance. This gap varies inversely with the
internal networth of the borrower and a
decline in networth reduces the borrowers’
spending, all else equal. The framework also
yields simple testable predictions related to
these money view and credit view arguments:
(1) When informational imperfections are
ignored, an increase in real interest rates
following amonetary contraction should
affect investment (broadly defined) simi-
larly for borrowers ofagiven type (for
example, with similar technology and
risk characteristics).
(2) Ifinformational imperfections aresignif-
icant only on the borrower side, all else
equal, spending by borrowers with lower
levels ofinternal net worth should fall
relative to spending by borrowers with
higher levels of internal net worth.
(3) Forbank-dependent borrowers, theavail-
ability of monitored bank credit can be
thought of as asubstitute for internal net
worth. Changes in the availability ofbank
credit can influence the ability ofbank-
dependentborrowers to finance spending.
(4) The model’sintuition can apply to banks
as well as nonfinancial borrowers. A
decline in banks’ networth raisesbanks’
opportunity cost of external funds (say in
the CD market). Asaresult, the cost of
funds to bank-dependent borrowers rises.
(5) Ifrelationships between borrowers and
specific banks are important, shocks to
the balance sheet positions ofindividual
lenders affect credit availability (at any
given open market interest rate) to their
borrowers,
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